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Most modelers, caught up in their fascination with the historical record of the prototypical aircraft reproduced as models, tend to overlook the occupant of the pilot’s seat. The Mission Into Darkness provides some insight into the human factor of air combat. In this case and in my opinion it is instructive to look at training and experience. The performance that day of the young Helldiver pilots, products of the USN training establishment that had just been fed into the operational units out there on “the sharp end,” can only be fully understood in this context. Brown, (1975) describes fighter pilots on carriers, but Brown’s commentary on the training the USN gave its naval aviators is instructive for all carrier aircrew: After “Carquals” the pilot was considered qualified and was appointed to a fighter squadron. With between 360 and 450 hours in his log-book, he was by far the most extensively and thoroughly trained ‘new boy’ of his day. There is a good description on how the training was phased, culminating in an intense work up at the squadron/air group level before joining a carrier in the forward areas. But recognize almost all the first tour aviators were arriving on their carriers with about 30 arrested landings and very little operational flying experience at night, and probably no night carrier landings. And the fates were sometimes less than kind: And we were about to meet the Beast. The disadvantage of the Helldiver far outweighed the pluses for most of the squadron pilots, especially the least-experienced ones, who were already having trouble in an SBD. It is one thing to fly around operationally without killing oneself on routine assignments—it is quite another to handle a plane on a combat mission, fully loaded with bombs and ammo, while getting shot at. To take the majority of VB-2 pilots out of the only combat aircraft they had flown, and were just starting to able to use as a weapon, put them into the Beast, and then launch them on a combat mission was imprudent. (Buell, 1991) The navy was expanding almost exponentially in mid-1944. New carriers, big and small were commissioning every month, and to use them to prosecute the war meant equipping them with squadrons and air groups that were combat–ready. The U.S. Navy had formed 45 such organizations [CVGs] over the previous two years to meet the constantly-growing demands of Pacific combat. Wartime experience had shown that three or more CVGs were required for every fast carrier in commission… while ships could operate almost indefinitely, the useful life of a combat air group was far less. Eight months was near-maximum; six was closer to the mark. (Jacobs, J. and Tillman, B., 1990) Hence the rotation scheme used to the end of the war, and in place by that time. Carriers stayed in the operating task forces until major damage sent them to the rear; sometimes they were rotated to the rear if force levels permitted. An air group arriving on a carrier replaced one being relieved. Each new squadron usually had a leavening of 2nd and 3rd tour pilots at the CO, XO and division leader level. - The rest were “nuggets.” Well trained perhaps, but most without serious operational experience. The air groups remained in the war zone on the parent carriers six-eight months before the cycle repeated. Survivors rotated back to start forming new squadrons where the former surviving nuggets now became the seasoned veterans who mentored the new nuggets. And so it went.
VB-2 received its first Helldivers on February 6, reported to Hornet in March 1944 and flew its first combat mission on April 1. (Tillman, 1997 and Buell). Dates for beginning combat operations for VB-1, VB-8 and VB-14 were May, March and May of 1944, respectively. The SB2C was new equipment for all of these squadrons. About six weeks – that’s the most operational experience most of these dive-bomber pilots had with the SB2C before the Mission, some of them a lot less. By contrast VB-10 and VB-16, the SBD outfits on Lexington and Enterprise, were near the end of their combat tours. And VB-10, unusually, was night-trained. (Cawley, D and Ramage, J.D., 1990). One lesson taught by the Mission was that night operational training should be done as a matter of course, and by the spring of 1945 all new CVGs were getting it.
Several of the references provide rather detailed development accounts on the SB2C. In June 1944 all first line VB squadrons with this aircraft were flying the –1C model, the least combat-ready version of any Helldiver fielded in large numbers. The –1C’s biggest problem appears to have been lack of horsepower. Only the additional 200 hp in the –3’s R-2600-20 engine and some other improvements kept the SB2C on the carrier decks: “When we joined Lexington it was clear that Vice Adm Mitscher had a low opinion of the SB2C. It was big, difficult to fit into corners, took more maintenance, and in his view had not acquitted itself well in combat…..At first he just tolerated us. But the SB2C-3 was entirely different aeroplane than the –1s/-1Cs that we had flown earlier. The bigger engine, and the electric-governed four-bladed propeller, gave it much more power. The nightmarish hydraulic system with its four separate garden-faucet style valves on the cockpit floor was improved. It still ‘weeped’ a little hydraulic here and there, but it was actually a pleasant aeroplane to fly and honest in the aerodynamic sense.” (Vice Adm Donald Engen, quoted in Tillman, 1997) Clearly, the –1C deserved both its reputation and “Beast” nickname, but just as clearly the navy believed a mature Helldiver was worth the effort, given the payoff in load carrying capability, speed and range over the SBD. Often leaking hydraulic oil from every fitting, underpowered and with those buffeting unpierced dive flaps, it had nonetheless been delivering the ordnance for some months prior to the Mission, and would get hits during the Mission. All sources agree on the Mission bomb load, one 1000 lb bomb internally and two 250 lb bombs on the wing racks. There are two sources that talk about “belly tanks” and “drop tanks,” but there is no photographic evidence of the latter and I would guess bomb bay tanks and bombs were mutually exclusive in the Helldiver.
VB-2’s #48 was hit by what was probably a 126mm projectile while in a dive on Zuikaku and suffered substantial damage (as did the pilot). The damage clearly made #48 difficult to fly and we may infer, a lot less aerodynamically efficient than it was before the dive. Nevertheless #48 made it all the way back to a TF 38 flight deck, albeit not the one from which it was launched; four other VB-2 Beasts were in company back to TF 38. (Buell). Experienced pilots were capable of flying the Helldiver on the Mission and getting damaged ones home again.
[NOTE: For the frustrated gunners among you, #48 was undoubtedly the target of a Type 94 gun director on either Zuikaku or a ship in the screen. This system demonstrably could track dive-bombers in their dives and generate gun-aiming and fuze-setting orders in time to hit the target on the way down. It was certainly the equal of the vaunted USN Mk 37 system.]
Other seasoned Mission dive-bomber pilots such as then-Lt. Cdr. Ramage questioned removing the SBD from the carriers. But he inadvertently gives away one reason: As I gave the hand signal indicating we were squared away on our return course, I began to pick up all sorts of stragglers. As soon as they picked up my heading they added throttle and left us. They weren’t going to get stuck with the SBD’s 150-kt max cruise speed! (Cawley, D and Ramage, J.D) The SBD could no longer keep up with the big boys. And, it had a 50-75 nm less combat radius than the SB2C, all other things being equal. In my opinion, the good showing of the SBD squadrons re fuel consumption, and the poor showing of the SB2C squadrons has less to do with airplanes and more to do with the experience of their pilots. And note the Avenger did not do all that well, either.
Mission Losses (Reference k)
Task Force 38 used up 97 Helldivers (81 combat, the rest operational losses) in June of 1944, the worst monthly loss of this type during the entire war. The US war machine was truly up and running by then, these losses representing about five days production. 104 aircrew were in the SB2Cs lost on May 20. Eight pilots and ten gunners were not recovered.
The specific aircraft is Hal Buell’s plane #48 from VB-2, that number in the usual places and the CVG-2 white circle on the stabilizer being the only non-factory markings on it.
I seem to have a fascination with the Helldiver dating back to my early teens. I remember at first how exciting it was to get my hands on that Monogram kit that came out about 1962. But even with the limited references available then, it soon became obvious it didn’t much resemble the real thing in several important areas. R-M made it all better with the release of the P-M kit a few years ago. I have already built two of and with Reference f in hand, planned a conversion of the –4 in the box to the –1C.
Basic Modifications required to turn the SB2C-4 Kit it into an SB2C-1C
1. Insertion of the windows behind the pilot’s cockpit. 2. Scratch building of the turnover pylon now visible in the windows. 3. Modification of the gunner’s sliding canopy back to the –1/3 version, and deletion of the external canopy rail below the cockpit sill. 4. Replacement of the kit prop with 3-bladed version and spinner 5. Replacement of those marvelous kit perforated P/E dive flaps with the solid type found on the –1C. 6. Filling in the recesses for the underwing rocket stub mounts.
I elected to do the model with the gunner’s canopy open and the .30 cal tail guns deployed with the turtleback in the ‘up’ position. Also, bomb bay doors closed, lower flaps in the take off position and 250 lb. bombs on the wing racks. Given the different opinions on whether Beasts were carrying drop tanks, it was tempting to add them to this model. But, although confessing not to possess the definitive Beast photo collection, I have not encountered so much as one photo of an operational SB2C-1C carrying drop tanks on the wing stations – not one.
Fuselage:
Wings:
All the Mission aircraft were in the mid-war Tri-color scheme of semi-gloss/nonspecular Sea Blue, Intermediate Blue and nonspecular Insignia White.
All interior spaces and parts, to include wheel wells and all landing gear part: Tamiya Interior Green. The interior of the open flaps was painted with Gunze Red. The fit on the assembled wings and horizontal tail are tight enough to require little or no filler in the joints, so I painted all of these components prior to assembly.
The last Helldiver had pushed over into its dive and the last bomb fired. The homeward journey lay ahead.
What had been accomplished? Few things are more ephemeral than evaluating hit claims by bomber pilots, and how does one separate out SB2C hits from the other aircraft present? The bombers of course had extra sets of eyes along for BDA, but we will never know the story in its entirety. What we do know is that in two days in late June of 1944, Task Force 38 and Pacific Fleet submarines destroyed beyond hope of redemption the Imperial Japanese Navy’s carrier striking force – ships, aircraft, aircrew.
Click the thumbnails below to view larger images: Model, Text and Images Copyright © 2003 by
Joe Lyons
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